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Abstract  
 
This paper uses the 2011 China Household Finance Survey data to estimate the effect 
of change in housing value on homeowners’ labor force participation. Using the 
average housing capital gains of other homes in the same community as an instrument 
for the housing capital gains of a given household, we find that a 100 thousand yuan 
increase in housing value leads to a 1.37 percentage point decrease in female 
homeowners’ probability of participating in the labor force and a 1.49 percentage 
point increase in their probability of becoming housewives. We find little effect on 
men’s labor force participation. 
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1. Introduction 
Along with rapid economic growth, China’s urban housing and labor markets 
experienced substantial structural changes during the past two decades. Chinese 
housing markets expanded in the 1990s when the central government started to 
implement comprehensive reforms to privatize housing properties in cities; by 2011 
nearly 90% of urban families were homeowners (Gan et al., 2013). Meanwhile, there 
has been an enormous housing price appreciation. According to the National Bureau 
of Statistics, during 2000-2013, average nominal housing price increased from 1,948 
to 5,850 yuan per square meter (Figure 1). Real housing prices have been growing 
10.5% annually in the 31 second-tier cities during 2003-2013, and 13.1% annually in 
the four first-tier cities: Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen (Fang et al., 
2015). 
In the meantime, Chinese urban labor markets also experienced a radical 
transition. The central planning system once guaranteed job opportunities to urban 
residents; however, massive layoffs occurred during the market-oriented reforms of 
the 1990s. Simultaneously, an increasing number of rural migrants entered the urban 
labor market. As a result, labor force participation rate declined and the 
unemployment rate rose (Feng et al., 2015). Since the early 2000s, labor force 
participation for men rebounded from the historically low levels of the 1990s, but has 
been stagnant for women (Figure 1).  
This paper examines the link between housing and labor markets in urban China. 
Specifically, we test whether changes in housing wealth affect labor force 
participation. The large variations in housing price appreciation across Chinese cities 
provide an ideal context for us to explore these effects. 
The wealth effect on leisure consumption and labor supply is a fundamental 
economic question that has attracted much attention from scholars. A few studies 
explore these dynamics using inheritance, lottery gains, housing voucher or rental 
subsidies as a positive income or wealth shock. Holtz-Eakin et al. (1993) find that 
large inheritances depress labor force participation in the U.S. Using data from the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics and Federal Estate Tax returns in the U.S., Joulfaian 
and Wilhelm (1994) find that inheritance income reduces working hours, but this 
effect is small. Brown et al. (2010) find that inheritance income increases older 
workers’ probability of retiring, and this effect is larger if the inheritance is 
unexpected. Using survey data of lottery players, Imbens et al. (2001) find that large 
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lottery winnings reduce winners’ working hours and labor force participation. Jacob 
and Ludwig (2012) and Fischer (2000) find that receiving housing vouchers or rental 
subsidies reduces labor force participation of recipients. These findings suggest that 
an increase in wealth is likely to reduce labor supply.  
Changes in housing wealth demonstrate similar dynamics; several studies 
document a negative association between housing price appreciation and labor 
supply.
1
 Henley (2004) finds that housing price appreciation significantly reduces 
women’s working hours in Britain. Farnham and Sevak (2007) find that a 10% 
increase in housing wealth reduces the expected retirement age by 3.5 to 5 months in 
the U.S. Disney and Gathergood (2014) show that, in Britain, housing price 
appreciation reduces young homeowners’ labor force participation and working hours. 
Milosch (2014) finds that a positive housing price shock decreases married female 
homeowners’ working hours and this effect is larger for highly educated, high income 
married women with children. However, housing price appreciation can also signal 
high costs of living and lead to more labor supply (Johnson, 2014); He (2015) 
provides such evidence based on 1997-2008 British Household Panel Survey data. 
Therefore, the net effect of housing wealth change on labor supply remains an 
empirical question. 
    The effects of housing capital gains on labor supply may be heterogeneous due to 
demographic characteristics. In cities with growing housing prices, renters may need 
to work more and save more (Sheiner, 1995). In Britain, housing capital gains have 
little effect on middle-aged homeowners’ employment or working hours (Disney and 
Gathergood, 2014). In the U.S., the effect of housing price shocks on labor supply is 
particularly strong for high income, high education women with young children at 
home (Milosch, 2014). 
Most of these studies analyze individual-level outcomes but use change in 
housing prices at a broad geographic area (county, city, or metropolitan area) level as 
a proxy for individual households’ housing wealth change. Without housing wealth 
information at the household level, these estimates may be biased because many 
unobserved location-specific attributes likely confound housing price change. 
Endogeneity issues may also arise because workers tend to sort into different 
                                                             
1
 Other studies estimate the effect of housing wealth change on goods consumption (Carroll and Zhou, 
2010; Campbell and Cocco, 2007; Case et al., 2005, 2013), college enrollment (Lovenheim, 2011； 
Cooper and Luengo-Prado, 2015), female fertility rate (Dettling and Kearey, 2014; Lovenheim and 
Mumford, 2013), and entrepreneurship (Adelino et al., 2015; Harding and Rosenthal, 2013).  
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locations with specific housing price dynamics based on unobserved personal 
attributes and income expectations (Starkey and Port, 1993; Moretti, 2013). Using 
instrumental variables for local housing prices cannot solve the sorting bias issue 
since the instruments need to be at the local level and unobserved individual 
preferences may correlate with even exogenous location attributes due to sorting. For 
example, using natural amenities or geographic features as instruments for housing 
prices is still problematic if workers with unobserved high ability strongly prefer 
natural amenities and disproportionally sort into such locations.  
Our study differs from the existing literature in two major aspects. First, we use a 
new micro dataset—the 2011 China Household Finance Survey data—to estimate the 
effect of a change in housing value on homeowners’ labor force participation in urban 
China. This dataset contains detailed information on housing and other assets for each 
household, including the purchasing price and current value of each housing unit (up 
to three housing units for each household), as well as detailed demographic 
information. This enables us to compute each household’s housing capital gain and 
estimate its effect on labor supply. Second, to address possible measurement error in 
self-reported housing value and potential omitted variables, such as individual 
workers’ income expectation and preferences for urban amenities, we use the average 
housing capital gain of households (excluding the household in question) in the same 
community as an instrument variable for change in housing value. This 
instrumental-variable (IV) approach is intuitively appealing: a homeowner’s housing 
price change should be highly correlated with his or her neighbors’ housing price 
change, but whether this homeowner decides to work or not should not be affected 
directly by the neighbors’ housing price changes.  
Our IV estimation results show that a 100 thousand yuan increase in housing 
value decreases female homeowners’ probability of joining the labor force by 1.37 
percentage points. This effect is stronger for young women with children. However, 
an increase in housing value has little effect on men’s labor force participation. We 
also find that a 100 thousand yuan increase in housing value increases women’s 
probability of becoming housewives by 1.49 percentage points, which is consistent 
with previous findings that women tend to decrease labor supply in response to capital 
gains and switch to alternative activities such as home production or taking care of 
children (Henley, 2004; Disney and Gathergood, 2014; Milosch, 2014). We also find 
evidence that increased housing capital gains have a slight positive effect on men’s 
4 
 
employment rate, but no effect on retirement age. 
Our findings provide some early empirical evidence on the effect of housing 
capital gains on labor market outcomes in urban China. Housing prices have been 
growing rapidly in China during the past two decades. With no property tax on homes, 
housing capital gains have all accrued to homeowners. Understanding the social and 
economic consequences of this housing wealth effect in China is very important for 
policymakers but relevant empirical evidence is scarce. This study aims to make such 
a contribution. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the data and 
specifies the econometric model. Section 3 discusses identification issues. Section 4 
presents the results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data and Empirical Specification 
We use the 2011 China Household Finance Survey (CHFS) data, which is similar 
to the Survey of Consumer Finance data in the U.S. It is the first micro dataset on 
household finance behavior in China. The survey employs a stratified three-stage, 
probability proportion to size (PPS) random sample design, and the sample is 
representative of households nationwide.
2
 The 2011 sample covers 25 provinces, 65 
cities, 80 counties, and 320 communities, including 8,438 households and 29,234 
individuals. 
The CHFS data contains detailed information on household finance including 
financial assets, non-financial assets, debts, insurance, income, and consumption, as 
well as rich demographics variables. The survey asks how many housing units a 
household owns and records housing attributes for up to three housing units. Housing 
attributes include floor area, purchase price, purchase year, self-reported current value, 
location of the first housing unit, and so forth.  
The sample we use consists of household heads and their spouses (if applicable) 
who own at least one housing property in urban China. We restrict people’s age to 
between 16 and legal retirement age, which is 60 for men, 55 for women cadres 
(government officials and senior managers at state-owned enterprises), and 50 for 
other women. As a robustness check, we also select a sample including people up to 
age 65, the cutoff commonly used in studies on developed countries.  
                                                             
2
 For more details about the CHFS data and its sampling scheme, see http://www.chfsdata.org.  
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We infer whether a person is in the labor force based on the following two survey 
questions. The first one asks ―do you currently have a job?‖ If the answer is ―no,‖ 
then the follow-up question is ―why don’t you have a job?‖ The survey lists nine 
options: (1) student in school; (2) housewife; (3) disabled; (4) have a seasonal job but 
am not currently in the work season; (5) child-rearing, health or personal reasons; (6) 
unemployed or haven’t found a job; (7) unwilling to work; (8) retired; (9) others. 
Following general practice, we define labor force participation rate as the percentage 
of the working age population who are employed or unemployed but actively 
searching for jobs (Juhn and Potter, 2006). We classify a person as in the labor force if 
the person currently has a job; has a seasonal job but is not currently in the work 
season; or is unemployed.  
To estimate the effect of housing wealth change on homeowners’ labor force 
participation, conceptually, we start with the following cross-sectional model: 
 
                        
′          (1) 
 
where the dependent variable LFPi is a dummy variable set to one if person i is in the 
labor force.                denotes person i’s housing wealth;  is a constant, 
and 
i is the error term.    represents other control variables including individual 
and household-level attributes that may affect an individual’s labor force participation 
decision. Individual-level control variables include a female dummy, age and age 
squared, a dummy indicating good health condition, a dummy for having a college 
degree or above. Household-level control variables include household size, number of 
children under age six, household income excluding the labor income of the person in 
question (a proxy for spouse income), number of housing units owned, total 
non-housing asset, total household debt, and average number of years owning all 
housing units.   
    The problem of estimating model (1) is that unobserved individual heterogeneity 
may correlate with both housing wealth and labor force participation, biasing the 
estimated key coefficient β. Ideally, we would use a panel dataset to estimate an 
individual fixed effect model. Unfortunately, panel data are not currently available. 
However, we do have information on housing wealth changes within each family. We 
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thus estimate coefficient β using the following specification:3 
 
                                                      
′      . (2) 
 
The new independent variables are defined as follows: 
HousingWealthChange：The key independent variable of interest. It measures the 
total change in housing wealth owned by a household, computed as the difference 
between self-reported current value of housing units and the purchase price of housing 
units deflated by consumer price indexes.
4
 If a household owns only one housing unit, 
the total housing wealth change is simply the capital gains (in real term) of this house 
over the tenure period. If a household owns two or three housing units, the total 
housing wealth change is the sum of the real capital gains of all units.
5
 In our sample, 
99.47% of homeowners have three or fewer housing units. The survey records price 
information only up to the third housing unit, so housing wealth is underestimated for 
the households that own more than three housing units. Note that a household may 
incur a housing capital loss, so the value of this HousingWealthChange variable may 
be negative.  
HousingPurchasePrice: The total purchase price of a household’s housing units, 
also deflated by consumer price indexes.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of these variables. The average labor 
force participation rate in our sample is 84%, 90% for men and 77% for women. The 
                                                             
3
 Consider the first difference of equation (1),                             , 
suppressing index i. Since               , expanding      and      we obtain      
                                   
      . Replacing initial housing wealth with 
housing purchase price, we can estimate β with this specification using only data for the current period. 
Our specification of equation (2) allows the coefficients of housing wealth change and initial housing 
wealth to be different because we instrument for                only. One caveat is that we 
assume unobserved individual heterogeneity in the current period is not correlated with initial housing 
purchase price. We thank Albert Saiz and Siqi Zheng for suggesting this interpretation of our empirical 
specification. 
4
 City level consumer price indexes are not available in China. We use the national consumer price 
index to deflate housing prices to year 2011. 
5
 We exclude housing units purchased before 1990. There was almost no housing market in China 
before 1990. Houses and apartments bought before 1990 are either of very low market value due to 
depreciation or of limited property rights due to the reform of housing welfare system. In the data, 
96.42% of housing units are bought or built after 1990.  
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mean housing capital gain is 357,000 yuan and the mean housing purchase price is 
325,000 yuan. Given the average years of owning a house is 9.42, the imputed 
annualized appreciation rate in real terms is 8.19% per year, suggesting that urban 
homeowners received substantial real capital gains. Housing capital gains are 
particularly large in the largest cities. For example, homeowners in Beijing, Shanghai, 
and Guangzhou on average receive 0.99 million yuan in housing capital gains over the 
tenure period. Our dataset enables us to compute housing wealth change for each 
homeowner; such cross-household variation in housing wealth change is not available 
in earlier studies that use housing price at the local level to proxy for housing wealth 
at the household level. 
 
3. Identification 
Three possible identification issues may bias the estimate of the key coefficient β 
in equation (2). First, the self-reported housing purchase price and current value may 
not be precise, so the key variable HousingWealthChange may contain measurement 
errors, biasing the estimated value of β toward zero and making us less likely to find 
an effect of housing wealth change on labor force participation. Second, there may be 
omitted variables that correlate with housing wealth change and labor force 
participation, which could bias our estimates in either direction. For example, 
unobserved positive shocks to labor demand in local labor markets may increase labor 
force participation and also drive housing price up, creating an upward bias in 
estimation. Another example is unobserved individual ability or preference. If people 
with higher unobserved ability are more likely to be employed and also to buy 
housing in fast-growing or amenity-rich locations, this would bias the estimates 
upward. Finally, there is likely a reverse causality issue: employed people tend to buy 
high-quality housing that appreciates more in value.
6
  
We include a set of demographic variables to control for individual and 
household characteristics and city fixed effects to control for unobserved location 
attributes. Furthermore, we employ an instrumental variable approach to address the 
aforementioned identification issues. A valid instrumental variable should be highly 
                                                             
6
 There have been some attempts to address the identification problem in the literature. Lovenheim 
(2011) uses lagged housing price to instrument for current housing price, but this strategy will not work 
if high ability people sort into cities with higher housing price appreciation. Zhao and Burge (2015) 
compare labor supply decisions between homeowners and renters in housing boom and bust periods 
and find that homeowners increase labor supply during housing bust periods because of housing wealth 
losses. 
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correlated with housing wealth change of individual households but uncorrelated with 
households’ labor force participation decisions through other channels. Our 
instrumental variable for HousingWealthChange is the average housing capital gains 
of other households living in the same community where the household in question 
lives.
7
 A community is a self-governed commune in cities with a size of between 
1000 and 2000 households.
8
 This instrumental variable is intuitively appealing if each 
household owns only one housing unit. In this case, the price change of one’s housing 
unit should be highly correlated with the price change of his or her neighbor’s housing 
simply because these two housing units are located close to each other; however, this 
person’s decision to work should not be directly affected by the price change of his or 
her neighbor’s house.  
When households have two or more housing units that are located in different 
cities, the relevance of our instrumental variable becomes weakened; the correlation 
of housing prices between cities is not as strong as within a city or within a 
community since housing markets are very localized. The CHFS data only records the 
location of the first housing unit owned by a household; for other housing units, we 
know only whether they are located within or outside of the city where the household 
currently lives. Therefore, when using the instrumental variable approach, we restrict 
our sample to the homeowners whose housing units are all located in the same city 
where they are currently residing. This reduces the sample size from 5,059 to 4,332.  
Table 1 shows that the mean of the instrumental variable is very similar to that of 
the endogenous variable HousingWealthChange.  
A potential threat to our identification strategy is the possibility that people live 
in the same community behave similarly (in terms of labor force participation) due to 
common neighborhood characteristics or social interactions. To address these 
concerns, we conduct two sets of robustness checks. First, we control for many 
community characteristics, described later. Second, assuming social interaction occurs 
only among close neighbors, we use average housing capital gains of families who 
live in other communities but within the same city as an alternative instrumental 
variable. Reassuringly, the results from these alternative specifications are very 
                                                             
7
 The idea of using the price of competing products to instrument for the price of a particular product is 
well known in the industrial organization literature (e.g., Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995). Our 
strategy here is similar to the one adopted by Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan (2007) who use 
surrounding neighborhood characteristics to instrument for housing price.  
8
 This is similar to a census tract (with an average of 1,600 housing units and 4,000 people) defined by 
the U.S. Census Bureau. 
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similar.  
 
4. Results 
 
OLS and Probit results  
We first select the sample of all urban homeowners regardless of where their 
housing units are located. We estimate equation (2) using both ordinary least squares 
(OLS) and Probit regressions. All standard errors are clustered at the city level. The 
results are presented in Table 2. Columns (1)-(3) are the OLS regression results and 
the coefficients of HousingWealthChange are significant in the full sample but not in 
the female and male subsamples. Probit estimation results are in Columns (4)-(6). In a 
few cities all individuals in the sample are in the labor force, therefore these city 
dummies perfectly predict the dependent variable (18 of them) and are dropped in the 
maximum likelihood estimation due to ―quasi-complete separation.‖ Column (4) 
shows that for the full sample, a 100 thousand yuan increase in housing wealth 
reduces a homeowner’s probability to work by 0.16 percentage points (statistically 
significant at the 1% level). This effect is not significant when estimated for women 
and men separately, consistent with the OLS regression results. Since these results 
may suffer from bias due to measurement errors, omitted variables, and reverse 
causality, they are suggestive at best.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
    The other control variables have reasonable signs and magnitudes. For example, 
Column (4) shows that women are less likely to work than men, consistent with the 
fact that, culturally, women’s roles are more family-centered. Homeowners with a 
college degree or above and people with good health condition are more likely to 
work. Homeowners with more children under six are less likely to work. Most of the 
coefficients of household-level control variables are not statistically significant. Since 
these controls are not the focus of our study, to conserve space we will not report them 
in the ensuing analysis.  
 
2SLS and IV Probit results 
We move on to the instrumental variable estimation. Our IV for the change in a 
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household’s total housing wealth is the average total housing wealth change of all 
other households in the same community. As mentioned above, we restrict the sample 
to households whose housing units are all located in the same city, reducing the 
effective sample size to 4,332. 
In the top panel of Table 3, columns (1)-(3) report OLS estimation results using 
this restricted sample. The coefficients of the key variable HousingWealthChange are 
all statistically insignificant. When using the two stage least squares (2SLS) 
regressions, this coefficient is statistically insignificant for the full sample and the 
male subsample but is significant for the female subsample. The coefficient of 
HousingWealthChange for the female subsample is -0.0137, suggesting that a 100 
thousand yuan increase in a household’s total housing wealth decreases women’s 
probability of joining the labor force by 1.37 percentage points. In other words, a one 
standard deviation increase in housing wealth change (659,000 yuan) decreases 
women’s probability of working by 9.03 percentage points. This impact is even 
greater in the largest cities; the mean housing wealth gains in Beijing, Shanghai, and 
Guangzhou are 0.99 million yuan, implying a 13.56 percentage point decrease in 
women’s probability of working compared with women without housing capital 
gains.
9
 This finding is consistent with the literature. For example, Henley (2004) 
points out that compared with men, women have a lower degree of labor market 
attachment and tend to put more value on home production or child rearing. In 
response to a housing wealth increase, women tend to decrease labor supply. Column 
(6) in Table 3 shows that housing capital gains actually increase men’s labor force 
participation although this effect is not statistically significant.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Table 3 also reports the first-stage results from the 2SLS regressions. The 
coefficient of the IV is around 0.75 and highly significant across all specifications. 
The value of the F statistic for weak instruments test in the first stage is much larger 
than 10 in Columns (4)-(6), suggesting a strong correlation between the IV and the 
instrumented variable HousingWealthChange.
 
Panel 2 of Table 3 reports the Probit 
                                                             
9
 Since the coefficients on the same variable in Probit models are not comparable across subsamples 
(Berry et al., 2010; Mood, 2010), we focus on interpreting the key coefficients based on 2SLS 
regressions.  
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and IV Probit results. They are very similar to the results from the linear probability 
models. For example, column (5) in Panel 2 shows that when housing capital gains 
increase by 100 thousand yuan, women’s probability of joining labor force will 
decrease by 1.43 percentage points.
 
 
Results on other outcome variables 
We next examine other dimensions of labor supply decisions, including 
employment, transition to housewife, early retirement, and self-employment outcomes. 
We report the regression results in Table 4.  
In Panel 1, Columns (1)-(3) show that a 100 thousand yuan increase in housing 
capital gains decreases women’s probability of being employed by 0.86 percentage 
points but increases males’ employment rate by 0.94 percentage points. While these 
coefficients seem reasonable, neither one is precisely estimated. The IV Probit model 
in Panel 2 shows a similar and marginally significant, negative effect for women but a 
much smaller (and still insignificant) positive effect for men.  
Since an increase in housing wealth reduces women’s incentive to work, it is 
natural to ask what activities they will engage instead. We estimate both 2SLS and IV 
Probit models using ―whether a woman is a housewife or not‖ as the dependent 
variable. The results are reported in Column (4) of Table 4. The 2SLS results show 
that a 100 thousand yuan increase in housing wealth increases the probability of being 
a housewife by 1.49 percentage points and this effect is significant at the 5% level. 
The IV Probit estimate suggests a much larger effect. Both cases show that women 
tend to substitute housework for market work in response to housing capital gains. 
 Following the literature (Farnham and Sevak, 2007), we also check if housing 
capital gains give people incentive to retire earlier. Based on the legal retirement age 
and the actual retirement status, we create a dummy variable indicating whether a 
person retired ahead of the legal retirement time and use it as the dependent variable. 
Columns (5)-(7) show that housing capital gains do not lead homeowners to retire 
early.   
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Some studies find that housing capital gains may serve as collateral helping 
homeowners creating businesses (Disney and Gathergood, 2009; Harding and 
Rosenthal, 2013; Hurst and Lusardi, 2004). Using data from the 2005 China 
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Inter-Census Population Survey and the Chinese Family Panel Studies, Li and Wu 
(2014) find that in urban China high housing prices actually discourage 
entrepreneurial activities, suggesting that the booming real estate industry crowds out 
other types of business investment. We also test whether housing capital gains 
strengthen or weaken homeowners’ incentives to own family businesses. The 
dependent variable equals one if a family is currently running a business. We only use 
the household head sample for this analysis, assuming the household head is the main 
economic decision maker in the family. The results are in Column (8) of Table 4. The 
2SLS and IV Probit estimates are both negative, but only the IV Probit coefficient is 
significant (only marginally). Thus there is weak evidence that housing capital gain 
creates a disincentive for homeowners to own businesses. The IV Probit estimate 
suggests that a 100 thousand yuan increase in housing capital gains reduces 
households’ probability to run businesses by 1.49 percentage points.  
 
Robustness checks 
We first address the issue whether the estimated housing wealth effect is 
confounded by a financial wealth effect. Existing literature finds that compared with 
housing wealth, financial wealth has a smaller effect on consumption (Case et al., 
2005). There has been little evidence whether financial wealth affects labor force 
participation. Our data contains information about the current value of financial 
wealth as well as last year’s income from financial assets. The questionnaire also 
indicates whether people have experienced gains or losses since they first started to 
trade on the stock market. In the first column of Table 5, we examine whether our 
main result is driven by an effect of financial wealth on women’s labor force 
participation. We use financial asset value and last year’s financial income as 
additional control variables, and also include two dummy variables, Earn Profit and 
Suffer Loss, to control for the homeowner’s performance on the stock market.10 Both 
the 2SLS and IV Probit results show that financial wealth has no effect on women’s 
labor force participation. The effect of housing wealth gains is unchanged after 
controlling for financial wealth. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
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 The break-even status is the base group. 
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Our instrument is the average housing capital gain of other households in the 
same community. As mentioned in Section 3, one might worry that people in the same 
community behave similarly due to common neighborhood characteristics or social 
interaction. In Column (2) of Table 5, we estimate the housing wealth effect on 
women’s labor force participation controlling for a variety of community 
characteristics including whether the community has professional property 
management, average car value, parking rates, tidiness of streets, cleanness of 
buildings, traffic congestion level, ratio of green coverage, and the level of economic 
development within the community.
11
 Both the 2SLS and the IV Probit estimates of 
the housing wealth effect on women’s labor force participation stay essentially the 
same. Adding community-level controls only slightly reduced the significance level of 
the estimates.  
To address the concern of social interaction among close neighbors, in Column (3) 
of Table 5, we use average housing capital gain of families who live in other 
communities within the same city as an alternative instrument since housing values in 
other communities should also be correlated with the value of the household in 
question. We are assuming that interaction only occurs among neighbors within the 
same community but not among families in different communities. Again, both the 
2SLS and IV Probit results show that housing capital gains have a negative and 
significant effect on women’s labor force participation when this alternative 
instrument variable is used.
12
 
Many existing studies select a sample of workers aged between 16 and 65. 
Although legal retirement age in China is lower, we also estimate the models using a 
larger sample including individuals aged between 16 and 65. Columns (1)-(3) of Table 
6 show that the general pattern is very similar to that in Table 3. For example, the IV 
Probit results show that a 100 thousand yuan increase in housing wealth reduces the 
probability of participating labor force by 1.39 percentage points for women but has 
little effect on men. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
If a household owns only one housing unit, perceived housing capital gains 
                                                             
11
 The sample size is smaller because some community characteristics variables have missing values. 
12
 The first stage regression shows that the coefficient on the instrumental variable is negative and 
significant, which indicates that higher housing wealth gains in one community implies lower gains in 
other communities. That is, housing units in different communities are substitutes. 
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probably are not as influential as they are to multi-home owners since the single 
housing unit serves as the primary residential place. We test this hypothesis in 
Columns (4)-(6) of Table 6 and find that the overall pattern for this subsample is very 
similar to the full sample and the effect on women’s labor force participation is 
negative, statistically significant, and with slightly smaller magnitudes as expected. 
The effect of housing wealth gains on labor force participation may vary over the 
life cycle. To check this, we estimate 2SLS and IV Probit models for the female 
subsample based on two demographic characteristics: age and whether there are 
children under age six in the household. Table 7 presents the results. The 2SLS results 
show that the negative effect of housing wealth gains on labor force participation is 
stronger for younger women (aged between 16 and 41, Column (1)), women with  
children under age six (Column (3)), and particularly so for younger women with 
children under age six (Column (5)), although most of the coefficients are 
insignificant. The IV Probit results in Panel 2 shows a stronger pattern: the 
magnitudes of all coefficients become slightly larger and statistically significant, 
except for women between the ages of 41 and 60.   
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
Overall, our robustness checks confirm our baseline finding that housing wealth 
gains have a significant, negative effect on women’s labor force participation in urban 
China.
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5. Conclusion 
During the past two decades, Chinese housing markets have experienced rapid 
price appreciation. We use the 2011 China Household Finance Survey data to estimate 
how a change in housing value affects homeowners’ labor force participation. To deal 
with potential identification issues, we employ an instrumental variable approach 
using the average housing capital gains of other households residing in the same 
community as an instrument for housing capital gains in a given household. We find 
that housing wealth appreciation has a significant, negative impact on women’s labor 
                                                             
13
 We also tried an alternative measure of housing wealth change using the difference between log 
current value and log purchase price. The results are qualitatively identical to those in Table 3. These 
results are available upon request. 
15 
 
force participation but little impact on men’s. A 100 thousand yuan increase in 
housing wealth reduces women’s probability of participating labor force by 1.37 
percentage points and increases women’s probability of becoming housewives by 1.49 
percentage points. These results are consistent with the previous findings that women 
are more attached to family and substitute market work by home production when 
experiencing a wealth increase. We also find that housing capital gains reduce 
homeowners’ incentive to run family businesses, and have little effect on the timing of 
homeowners’ retirement. These findings together provide some early empirical 
evidence on the effect of housing price dynamics on labor market outcomes in urban 
China.  
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Figure 1: Labor force participation rates and housing price in urban China 
 
 
Data Source: China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) and National Bureau of Statistics 
Labor force participation rate is defined as the percentage of employed and unemployed people among 
working age population. It is calculated using multi-wave data from the China Health and Nutrition 
Survey (CHNS), a national representative household survey jointly conducted by the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention. The web site 
of CHNS data is http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/china. Average residential housing price data are 
provided by the National Bureau of Statistics (http://data.stats.gov.cn/easyquery.htm?cn=C01). It is 
calculated by dividing the total sales of residential housing by total floor area of residential housing 
sold each year.  
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
Variable description  Obs.        Mean  
 Std. 
Dev. 
 Min.         Max. 
LFP dummy (=1 if a person is in the labor 
force) 
5,059 0.84 0.36 0 1 
LFP dummy for female sample 2,229 0.77 0.42 0 1 
LFP dummy for male sample 2,830 0.90 0.30 0 1 
HousingWealthChange 5,059 3.57 6.54 -37.90 63.01 
HousingWealthChange for the IV sample  4,332 3.68 6.58 -12.55 63.01 
Instrument variable for HousingWealthChange  
(average housing capital gains of other  
households living in the same community) 
4,332 3.71 5.20 -0.39 24.98 
Instrument variable for HousingWealthChange  
(average housing capital gains of households 
in other communities in the same city) 
1,768 3.78 5.04 -0.28 19.88 
Total purchase price of housing units 5,059 3.25 5.13 0.00 77.90 
Average purchase years 5,059 9.42 4.96 1.00 21.00 
Number of housing units owned 5,059 1.26 0.54 1.00 11.00 
Female dummy 5,059 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Age 5,059 41.25 8.87 16.00 60.00 
College dummy (=1 with a college degree or 
above) 
5,059 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Good health dummy (=1 if health condition is 
 good or better) 
5,059 0.42 0.49 0 1 
Number of Children under age 6 5,059 0.25 0.48 0.00 4.00 
Household income (excluding individual labor 
income) 
5,059 0.56 1.71 -4.91 30.00 
Household size 5,059 3.47 1.14 1.00 9.00 
Household assets (excluding housing) 5,059 2.61 7.96 0.00 116.4 
Household debts 5,059 0.79 3.46 0.00 107.8 
Employed dummy 5,059 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Own family business dummy 2,423 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Retired early dummy 5,059 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
Housewife dummy 5,059 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
 
Note: The sample of size 5,059 includes homeowners who own at least one housing unit and 
meet other criteria described in Section 3 of the paper. The sample of size 4,332 keeps the 
homeowners whose housing units are located in the same city. All monetary values are in 
100,000 yuan using 2011 value adjusted by annual consumer price index, when applicable. 
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Table 2: Effect of housing wealth change on labor force participation, OLS and Probit 
estimation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
OLS 
  
Probit 
 
Variables 
Full Female Male Full Female Male 
Sample Sample Sample Sample  Sample  Sample 
HousingWealthChange -0.0014
**
 -0.0017 -0.0008 -0.0016
***
 -0.0022 -0.0011 
 
(0.0005) (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0006) (0.0015) (0.0007) 
Female dummy -0.1624
***
 
  
-0.1793
***
 
  
 
(0.0088) 
  
(0.0094) 
  Age 0.0609
***
 0.0787
***
 0.0577
***
 0.0574
***
 0.0766
***
 0.0404
***
 
 
(0.0058) (0.0130) (0.0056) (0.0038) (0.0116) (0.0025) 
Age squared -0.0008
***
 -0.0010
***
 -0.0008
***
 -0.0008
***
 -0.0010
***
 -0.0005
***
 
 
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) 
College dummy 0.0677
***
 0.1270
***
 0.0249
**
 0.0895
***
 0.1692
***
 0.0352
**
 
 
(0.0111) (0.0221) (0.0104) (0.0182) (0.0290) (0.0151) 
Good health dummy 0.1869
***
 0.3253
***
 0.0765
***
 0.2269
***
 0.4259
***
 0.1002
***
 
 
(0.0100) (0.0144) (0.0118) (0.0135) (0.0258) (0.0121) 
Number of Children 
under 6 -0.0467
***
 -0.1149
***
 0.0110 -0.0399
***
 -0.1058
***
 0.0153 
 
(0.0126) (0.0215) (0.0121) (0.0118) (0.0192) (0.0145) 
Household size 0.0038 0.0004 0.0011 0.0053 0.0038 -0.0001 
 
(0.0052) (0.0075) (0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0070) (0.0045) 
Household income -0.0014 0.0018 -0.0031 -0.0006 0.0022 -0.0018 
 
(0.0025) (0.0040) (0.0026) (0.0020) (0.0028) (0.0018) 
Total purchase 
price of housing units -0.0017 -0.0041
**
 -0.0003 -0.0017 -0.0037
**
 -0.0009 
 
(0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0017) 
Number of housing 
units owned 0.0220
*
 0.0458
***
 0.0068 0.0181 0.0474
***
 0.0021 
 
(0.0124) (0.0157) (0.0144) (0.0123) (0.0176) (0.0104) 
Average purchase years 0.0006 -0.0017 0.0025
**
 0.0004 -0.0013 0.0021
*
 
 
(0.0013) (0.0019) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0019) (0.0012) 
Household assets -0.0013
*
 -0.0019
*
 -0.0003 -0.0011 -0.0016 -0.0004 
 
(0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0008) 
Household debts 0.0025 0.0057
**
 -0.0003 0.0031 0.0072 0.0007 
 
(0.0016) (0.0024) (0.0017) (0.0025) (0.0051) (0.0016) 
Sample size 5,059 2,229 2,830 5,041 2,221 2,736 
R
2
 (Pseudo R
2
) 0.1840 0.2146 0.1829 0.2554  0.2498   0.2660 
 
Note: A constant term and city fixed effects are included in all the models, but their 
coefficients are not reported here. Standard errors are clustered at the city level and listed in 
parentheses. Coefficients in Columns (4)-(6) are marginal effects. 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
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Table 3: Effect of housing wealth change on labor force participation, IV estimation 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables 
Full 
sample 
Female 
sample 
Male 
sample 
Full 
sample 
Female 
sample 
Male 
sample 
Panel 1: Linear Probability Model Results 
  OLS  2SLS 
HousingWealthChange -0.0011 -0.0013 -0.0002 -0.0038 -0.0137
**
 0.0055 
 (0.0010) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0050) (0.0056) (0.0069) 
Sample size 4,332 1,896 2,436 4,332 1,896 2,436 
R
2
 (Centered R
2
) 0.1820 0.2139 0.1953 0.1642 0.1734 0.1556 
    First-stage regression 
Instrumental variable for    0.7500
***
 0.7517
***
 0.7513
***
 
HousingWealthChange    (0.1080) (0.1403) (0.0924) 
First stage F test    48.19 28.69 66.07 
Panel 2: Probit Results 
  Probit   IV Probit  
HousingWealthChange -0.0011 -0.0018 -0.0005 -0.0034 -0.0143
**
 0.0025 
 (0.0010) (0.0019) (0.0014) (0.0043) (0.0057) (0.0053) 
Sample size 4,317 1,889 2,356 4,317 1,889 2,356 
Pseudo R
2
 0.2472 0.2470 0.2694 
    
Note: All models include a constant term and the same set of control variables as in Table 2, 
but their coefficients are not reported here. Standard errors are clustered at the city level and 
listed in parentheses. First-stage F tests report the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 
produced in the first stage of the 2SLS regressions. Coefficients for Probit and IV Probit 
models are marginal effects. 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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 Table 4: Effect of housing wealth change on other labor supply decisions 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Employment Housewife 
Early 
retirement 
Own 
business 
 
Full 
sample 
Female 
sample 
Male 
sample 
Female 
sample 
Full 
sample 
Female  
sample 
Male 
Sample 
Full 
sample 
Panel 1: 2SLS 
HousingWealthChange 0.0010 -0.0086 0.0094 0.0149
***
 -0.0015 0.0039 -0.0054 -0.0058 
 (0.0068) (0.0060) (0.0109) (0.0053) (0.0050) (0.0046) (0.0058) (0.0061) 
Sample size 4,332 1,896 2,436 1,896 4,332 1,896 2,436 2,423 
R
2
 (Centered R
2
) 0.2246 0.2593 0.1795 0.1308 0.1746 0.1242 0.1932 0.1277 
First-stage regression 
Instrumental variable for 0.7500
***
 0.7517
***
 0.7513
***
 0.7517
***
 0.7500
***
 0.7517
***
 0.7513
***
 0.7308
***
 
HousingWealthChange (0.1080) (0.1403) (0.0924) (0.1403) (0.1080) (0.1403) (0.0924) (0.0807) 
First stage F test 48.19 28.69 66.07 28.69 48.19 28.69 66.07 81.99  
Panel 2: IV Probit 
HousingWealthChange 0.0006 -0.0100
*
 0.0056 0.0303
***
 0.0006 0.0067 -0.0017 -0.0149
*
 
 (0.0062) (0.0061) (0.0089) (0.0114) (0.0027) (0.0057) (0.0030) (0.0084) 
Sample size 4,332 1,896 2,427 1,205 3,795 990 2,114 2,432 
Note: All models include a constant term and the same set of control variables as in Table 2, 
but their coefficients are not reported here. Standard errors are clustered at the city level and 
listed in parentheses. First-stage F tests report the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 
produced in the first stage of the 2SLS regressions. Coefficients for Probit and IV Probit 
models are marginal effects. 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 5: Effect of housing wealth change on female labor force participation, robustness 
checks 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Financial 
Wealth Effect 
Community  
Characteristics 
IV: Housing 
capital gains 
of other 
communities 
in the same 
city  
Panel 1: 2SLS 
HousingWealthChange -0.0139
**
 -0.0157
**
 -0.0107
**
 
 (0.0056) (0.0080) (0.0049) 
Financial Asset -0.0027   
 (0.0038)   
Financial Income -0.0899   
 (0.1327)   
Earn Profit 0.0198   
 (0.0604)   
Suffer Loss 0.0289   
 (0.0386)   
Community Characteristics No Yes No 
Sample size 1,896 1,629 1,768 
R
2
 (Centered R
2
) 0.1734 0.1718 0.1819 
First-stage regression 
Instrument variable for 0.7527
***
 0.6595
***
 -3.0377
***
 
HousingWealthChange (0.1356) (0.1556) (0.7078) 
First stage F test 30.80  17.95 18.42 
Panel 2: IV Probit 
HousingWealthChange -0.0147
**
 -0.0146
*
 -0.0121
***
 
 (0.0058) (0.0078) (0.0046) 
Financial Asset -0.0032   
 (0.0040)   
Financial Income -0.0770   
 (0.1090)   
Earn Profit 0.0087   
 (0.0652)   
Suffer Loss 0.0447   
 (0.0521)   
Community Characteristics No Yes No 
Sample size 1,889 1,629 1,768 
Note: All models are estimated using an only-female sample. All models include a constant 
term and the same set of control variables as in Table 2 but their coefficients are not reported 
here. Standard errors are clustered at the city level and listed in the parentheses. First-stage F 
tests report the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic produced in the first stage of the 2SLS 
regressions. Coefficients for Probit and IV Probit models are marginal effects. 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6: Effect of housing wealth change on labor force participation, alternative samples 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
16≤age≤65 Have only one housing unit 
 
Full 
sample 
Female 
sample 
Male 
sample 
Full 
sample 
Female 
sample 
Male 
sample 
Panel 1: 2SLS 
HousingWealthChange -0.0047 -0.0132 0.0038 -0.0036 -0.0108
**
 0.0045 
 
(0.0054) (0.0086) (0.0074) (0.0064) (0.0051) (0.0072) 
Sample size 5,427 2,774 2,653 3,429 1,512 1,917 
R
2
 (Centered R
2
) 0.3202 0.2772 0.2987 0.1360 0.1998 0.1742 
First-stage regression 
Instrumental variable for 0.7353
***
 0.7293
***
 0.7438
***
 0.8068
***
 0.8134
***
 0.8026
***
 
HousingWealthChange (0.1118) (0.1178) (0.1072) (0.1201) (0.1678) (0.0938) 
First stage F test 43.23 38.33 48.10 45.16 23.49 73.23 
Panel 2: IV Probit 
HousingWealthChange -0.0049 -0.0139
*
 0.0025 -0.0045 -0.0125
***
 0.0020 
 (0.0044) (0.0073) (0.0056) (0.0061) (0.0048) (0.0058) 
Sample size 5,427 2,774 2,609 3,414 1,505 1,812 
Note: All models include a constant term and the same set of control variables as in Table 2, 
but their coefficients are not reported here. Standard errors are clustered at the city level and 
listed in parentheses. First-stage F tests report the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic 
produced in the first stage of the 2SLS regressions. Coefficients for Probit and IV Probit 
models are marginal effects. 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 7: Effect of housing wealth change on female labor force participation by demographics  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables 16≤age≤41 41<age≤60 With children 
Without 
children 
16≤age≤41 and 
with children 
Panel 1: 2SLS 
HousingWealthChange -0.0198
**
 -0.0045 -0.0365 -0.0106 -0.0225 
 
(0.0078) (0.0070) (0.0237) (0.0067) (0.0282) 
R
2
 (Centered R
2
) 0.2198 0.1527 0.2270 0.1411 0.3278 
Sample size 1,097 799 431 1,465 367 
First-stage regression 
Instrumental variable for 0.6637
***
 0.7805
***
 0.5557
**
 0.7880
***
 0.5452
*
 
HousingWealthChange (0.0723) (0.2700) (0.1749) (0.1381) (0.2777) 
First Stage F test 84.34 8.36 10.10 32.58 3.85 
Panel 2: IV Probit 
HousingWealthChange -0.0253
**
 -0.0068 -0.0436
**
 -0.0119
*
 -0.0883
***
 
 (0.0105) (0.0066) (0.0189) (0.0063) (0.0300) 
Sample size 662 780 415 1,439 195 
 
Note: All models use the female subsample. All models include a constant term and the same 
set of control variables as in Table 2, but their coefficients are not reported here. Standard 
errors are clustered at the city level and listed in parentheses. First-stage F tests report the 
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic produced in the first stage of the 2SLS regressions. 
Coefficients for Probit and IV Probit models are marginal effects. 
***
, 
**
, and 
*
 indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
